The main purpose of this paper is to provide a syntax-based analysis of the differences between the two Korean causal clauses, i.e. ese-clauses and nikka-clauses. Focusing on the various aspects of Mood distinction, we claim that nikka and eseclauses can be analyzed as indicatives and subjunctives, respectively. Such an analysis enables us to provide syntactic explanations for issues-what we call the 1 st person restriction of ese-clauses and its obviation-which might be considered merely semantic/pragmatic issues.
Main puzzle: The st person restriction of ese-clauses
Korean has two causal connectives, -nikka and -ese 'because'. In most cases, they can be used interchangeably without noticeable differences in their meanings:
(1) Pi-ka o-ase/nikka ttang-i cecnunta. rain-Nom come-because ground-Nom wet 'Because it rains, the ground is getting wet.'
The two connectives, however, exhibit different distributions with respect to the main clause subject when they contain a Contrastive Topic (CT) marking: while ese-clauses display person restrictions on the main clause subject, nikka-clauses do not. In (2), for example, both -ese and -nikka allow CT-marking when the main clause subject is 1 st person. In this case, the CT conveys the implied message that the speaker believes that Hoya cannot fulfill other conditions required for marriage, such as a full-time job position.
(2) a. pro2 cip-un sa-se, na1-nun pro house-CT buy-ese I-Top Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta. Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl b. pro2 cip-un sa-ss-unikka, na1-nun pro house-CT buy-Past-nikka I-Top Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta. Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl 'I married Hoya because he (at least) bought a house.' However, the two connectives behave differently when the main clause subject is not 1 st person. As in (3a), an ese-clause does not allow CT-marking, when the main clause subject is 3 rd person. We name this constraint the 1 st Person Restriction (PR). Unlike ese-clauses, nikka-clauses allow CTmarking regardless of whether the main clause subject is 1 st person or not. In (3b), Yuna is the one who believes Hoya at least meets the minimum condition for marriage, but it is possible that he cannot fulfill any other conditions. 1 (3) a. #pro2 cip-un sa-se, Yuna1-nun pro house-CT buy-because Yuna-Top Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta. Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl 'Yuna married Hoya because he (at least) bought a house.' b. pro2 cip-un sa-ss-unikka, Yuna1-nun pro house-CT buy-Past-nikka Yuna-Top Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta. Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl 'Yuna married Hoya because he (at least) bought a house.'
Note that an ese-clause displays this restriction only in cases where it contains a CT marker:
(4) pro2 cip-ul sa-se, na1/Yuna1-nun pro house-Acc buy-ese I/Yuna-Top Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta.
Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl 'I/Yuna married Hoya because he bought a house'
More surprisingly, PR can be circumvented when even one of the arguments in the ese-clause is coindexed with the subject of the main clause. It is commonly claimed that as an applicative construction -e cwu-adds a goal argument of the beneficiary relation (Jung 2014, etc.) . PR can be obviated due to a co-indexation of the goal argument with the main clause subject, as in (5).
(5) pro2 cip-un pro1 sa-cwu-ese, pro house-CT pro buy-give-because na1/Yuna1-nun Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta. I/Yuna-Top Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl 'Yuna married Hoya because he (at least) bought a house for her.' Just like (3b), the implied massage in (5) is that Yuna believes it is possible that Hoya meets the minimum condition for marriage, but he cannot fulfill other conditions. Thus, (3b) and (5) show that the unacceptability of (3a) cannot be attributed to a semantic/pragmatic anomaly.
Causal clauses and Contrastive marking
To explain PR, it is necessary to understand the CT-marking in causal clauses. As widely pointed out in the previous literature, CT-marking is restricted in embedded contexts: while it is allowed in a causal clause but not in a temporal/conditional clause: (e.g., Hara 2008 , Tomioka 2015 for Japanese, Park & Hoe 2015, etc.) (6) * Hangsang aitul-un cip-ey always children-CT house-to o-l ttay, kay-ka cic-nun-ta. come when dog-Nom bark-Pres-Decl 'When (at least) children come to our house, dogs always bark.' (based on Hara 2008) (7) Sacangnim-un John-i ilpone-nun president-Top John-Nom Japanese-CT hal cul-a-nikka/al-ase chayonghay-ss-ta. do can-because hire-Past-Decl 'Because John can speak (at least) Japanese, the president hired him.' (based on Hara 2008) According to Hara (2008) , a CT-marking conveys an implied message that some epistemic bearer (mostly the speaker of the 'utterance context' (CU, hereafter)) entertains the possibility that the stronger scalar alternatives to the asserted proposition are false (e.g., it is possible that John cannot speak both Japanese and Korean in (7)). For such a scalar comparison, the use of CT requires some kind of epistemic bearer who has limited knowledge. Given this, Hara (2008) claims that CT-marking is licensed in causal clauses because causal clauses can fulfill the requirement about the epistemic bearer by introducing their own contexts.
The idea of introducing an additional context can also be supported by Davidson's (1963) primary reason. According to Davidson, doing something for a reason means doing something intentionally. Thus, to accept a rationalization of an action, we should be able to say what caused the agent to do the action (e.g., attractions, obligations, etc.). Davidson claims that when somebody does something for a reason, he must have a primary reason that consists of (i) a pro-attitude toward an action of a certain kind (e.g. desires come from moral believes, social conventions, etc.), and (ii) a belief that doing his action is of that kind, and (iii) this belief and desire cause him in the right way to do the action. In this way, the primary reason can be understood as a cause of the action. In order to accept only intentionally qualified causal relations, a kind of screening of the causal relation is added (expressed by "in the right way"). The relation between the reason/cause and its unintended outcomes cannot be qualified as a "right" causal relation. As exemplified in Davidson (1963) , if someone turned on the light and by doing so he happened to alert the burglar in the room, the relation between the two events cannot be qualified as a right causal relation if the pro-attitude is supposed to be an intention. Given this, we can say that the use of causal clauses adds some additional context corresponding to the qualifying process. We call this additional context 'reason context (CR, hereafter)'.
If we accept Kaplanian context, a context can be construed as a tuple of indices identifying the contextual features such as an author, addressee, etc. In this way, CU and CR can be illustrated as in (8). (8) <author (= subject of the main clauses), addressee, tense (= tense information of the main clauses), location, …..> As in (8), the CR is different from the CU in that its author feature is associated with the subject of the main clause (see also Hara 2008) .
Indicative vs. Subjunctive Mood
To explain PR, we claim that there's a correspondence between the two causal clauses and two different moods. In this section, we layout semantic and syntactic properties of mood distinction and provide some evidence. According to A&H, in the complement of 'believe' type verbs, doxastic attitudes of John (that is the attitude holder) can license the embedded epistemic modal might. In contrast, in the complement of 'want' type verbs, since doxastic attitudes of the attitude holder are not involved, the embedded epistemic modal cannot be licensed. A&H argue that such a distinction is attributed to the mood distinction: while 'believe' type verbs select an indicative complement, 'want' type verbs select a subjunctive complement. We assume that causal connectives introduce modal environments similar to attitude verbs. Recall Davidson's (1963) claim that primary reasons in causal relation always consist of a pro-attitude and belief related in the right way. Given this, we further claim that the two causal clauses are different in their moods: nikka-clauses and ese-clauses correspond to indicative and subjunctive mood, respectively.
Semantic Aspect
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The supporting evidence for the current analysis can be found in the examples like (10). As in (10), while nikka-clauses allow epistemic modals, eseclauses do not.
(10) The speaker came to know that a bomb went off at the park .... a. Mina-ka cip-ey iss-e ya ha-nikka, Mina-Nom home-Loc stay-have to-nikka na-nun ansim-i-ta. I-Top be.releived-Cop-Decl 'Because Mina must be home, I feel relieved.' (ok) Circumstantial, (ok) Epistemic b. Mina-ka cip-ey iss-e ya ha-ese, Mina-Nom home-Loc stay-have to-ese na-nun ansim-i-ta. I-Top be.releived-Cop-Decl 'Because Mina must be home, I feel relieved.' (ok) Circumstantial, *Epistemic
The modal -e ya ha-in (10a) can be interpreted as either circumstantially (i.e. 'Mina is obligated to stay at home due to the curfew hour. Thus, I am not worried about her safety') or epistemically (i.e. 'As far as I know, it is quite certain that Mina stays at home since she is very tired due to a long trip. Thus, I am not worried about her safety.'). In (10b), by contrast, -e ya ha-is interpreted only as a circumstantial modal.
Syntactic Aspect
On the syntactic side, various syntactic analyses have been proposed to explain the mood distinction concerning: finiteness, phi-feature agreements, 2 Portner & Rubinstein (2012) show convincingly that despite a similar meaning, two relevant predicates can select a different complement with respect to moods (e.g. vouloir 'want'-subjunctive vs. espérer 'hope'-indicative in French, etc.). We refer to Portner & Rubinstein (2012) for more detailed discussion. 3 Some might say that the subjunctive is not suitable for causal clauses since it has been discussed that its content cannot be regarded as a true statement (e.g. irrealis, non-veridicality, etc.). But this seems not always the case as evidenced by the cases like prin 'before'-subjunctive vs. afu 'after'-indicative in Greek (Giannakidou 2015) and so on. See also de Jonge (2001), A&H (2009) for alternatives regarding the semantic nature of the subjunctive mood. temporal markers, designated verbal forms, special kinds of the complementizer, etc. However, Bianchi (2001 Bianchi ( , 2003 argues that many of them are just peripheral effects related to the finiteness, and that it is context anchoring that plays a crucial role to determine moods and finiteness (See also Amritavalli 2014). 4 In this regard, it can be said that the mood determination has to do with the context choice: which context can/should the materials in the complements be evaluated with? Based on Bianchi's (2001 Bianchi's ( , 2003 analysis, we suggest (11).
(11) The taxonomy of (syntactic) Moods a. Indicative: All the context sensitive elements in the complements can be freely evaluated with the embedded context and/or CU. b. Subjunctive (i) Internally Centered logophoric Subjunctive (ILS): In the C-T layer of the complements, the logophoric elements should be used and evaluated relative to the embedded context via internal Logophoric anchoring (iLa, hereafter). (ii) Non-Internally anchored Subjunctive (NIS): Compared to ILS, some regular expressions can be employed instead of the logophoric elements and they can be associated with the outer perspective sources.
As for the indicatives, it is generally assumed that the elements in the embedded clause can be freely evaluated with the CU. In this regard, the Double Access Reading (DAR) of tense is well studied (Abusch 1997 , Giorgi & Pianesi 1997 It is well-known that in some languages (e.g. English, Italian, French, Spanish, and many other), the embedded indicative tense is evaluated twice: once 4 Accordingly, we can say that as long as the finiteness is verified, the impoverishment of verbal forms does not necessarily mean the absence of the subjunctive mood.
As for the finiteness and the subjunctive mood in Korean, we refer to Lee (2009) . See also Giannakidou (2009) and Yoon (2013) for more detailed discussions on the various patterns of the subjunctive mood.
it is anchored to the CU and once it is anchored to the 'attitude context (CA, hereafter)'. As seen in (12), even if John believed Mary's pregnancy in the past, Mary should still be pregnant 'now'. Usually, this is understood as (13) (see Giorgi & Pianesi 1997 for more detailed discussion).
(13) a. The indicative complement can specify the independent tense, which can be directly evaluated with respect to CU. b. On the contrary, it has been argued that DAR is not generally available in subjunctive complements.
Unfortunately, DAR is hard to test in our target sentences since it is not clear whether Korean belongs to the DAR language group or not (see Kim 2013 for details). However, (13a) may still be relevant since there is evidence to show that only niikka-clauses allow the independent tense. Previous analyses point out that unlike ese-clauses, nikka-clauses are obligatorily marked with tense (e.g., Lee S. 1978; Lee, E. 1990; etc.) . Also, the main clause and the nikka-clause can be independent from each other with respect to their temporal interpretations. Unlike nikka, the tense of the eseclause relies on the temporal interpretation of the main clause (Park 2015: p.53) . As many authors have proposed, if only the indicative clauses allow independent tense (Landau 2004 (Landau , 2015 Giannakidou 2009, etc.) , the contrast in (14) can be easily accounted for.
Unlike indicatives, Bianchi (2001 Bianchi ( , 2003 argues that subjunctives can be subdivided along the (un-)obligatory use of the logophoric elements at the C-T layer depending on how much the C-T layer can reflect the independent phi-agreements.
In this line, to support ILS, Bianchi discusses the Obligatory Control (OC, hereafter) originating from attitude verbs. It is widely assumed that some logophoric elements should be interpreted with respect to a certain perspectival relation regarding SELF, PIVOT, SOURCE (Sells 1987) and so on. Bianchi argues that PRO is one of them as evidenced by sentences like (15); PRO should be coindexed with the addressee of the CA in (15). In cases like (15), when the CA is constituted by a 'want' type verb like myenglyenghata 'order', its external argument (Yuna in 15) corresponds to the author of the CA, and its internal argument (Yumi in 15) corresponds to the addressee of the CA (Bianchi 2003 , Landau 2015 . Given this, Bianchi argues that if the denotation of PRO should be determined in terms of iLa, we can explain why PRO should be co-indexed with the argument(s) of the matrix attitude verbs. Furthermore, we can say that the semantic correlation discussed in section 3.1 still hold since the complement of 'want' type verbs should be subjunctive.
Roughly summarizing, what Bianchi argues is that the distribution of PRO is (partly) attributed to the subjunctive mood allowing iLa (see also Landau 2015 for a similar analysis). In this regard, we can also easily find evidence for the existence of NIS: when a 3 rd person pronominal subject is employed in a supposed OC complement, it comes to allow a Non-OC reading (though rather marginal). Under the scenario in (16a), (16b) is much more acceptable than (15) weakening the OC reading. With this, we can easily draw a conclusion that iLa is blocked in (16b) in the following way: as widely discussed, unlike PRO, regular pronominals cannot be licensed in ILS since a more articulated structure (regarding phi-agreement, for example) is required (Bianchi 2001 , 2003 , Landau 2004 . But such a complement should still be subjunctive since it is selected by the 'want' type predicate. Thus, even though Korean lacks any other overt cues like phi-agreements, the use of an overt pronominal subject is enough to show that the complement in (16b) amounts to NIS rightly predicting the absence of iLa.
Ese vs. Nikka: Mood distinction
Up to this point, we have discussed two aspects of the mood distinction and provide some evidence to show that ese-clauses are identified with subjunctives while nikka-clauses are identified with indicatives. In this section, we further propose that such a distinction also holds in regard to iLa.
More on the causal relation.
As we have seen in section 2, Davidson (1963) claims that the relation between the action and the reason for doing something can be accepted only in the case such that it is qualified in a right way, and this is why we add the independent CR. However, such a qualification is not freely given in relation to the CR. Instead, we suggest that there should be a type of doxastic information included in causal clauses, and it is necessary to judge whether this information is qualified from the evidential bearer's perspective (cf. Hara 2008) . We call this process the judge requirement.
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This poses one interesting question. As widely discussed, when a speaker utters a declarative sentence, the content in it should be regarded as true according to her doxastic information. If, then, the declarative sentence contains a causal clause, the following condition should hold, too.
(17) Felicity condition of the causal relations:
The speaker is certain about the judge requirement.
Notice that (17) is not trivially satisfied. As discussed, the CR exists independently, and it plays a crucial role for the judge requirement. Thus, it is possible to imagine situations where the speaker cannot be the proper Evidential Bearer (EB, hereafter) of the causal relation.
Nikka vs Ese: Judge requirement
Following Speas (2004), Tenny (2006) and others, we assume that Evid(ential) Phrase constitutes a perspectival relation in causal clauses (cf. evidential OP in Hara 2008) . Based on this, we suggest that the Judge requirement is also provided through the EvidP. Given all this, suppose that the default structure of ese-clauses is ILS. Then, we can say that since EB is responsible for a perspective relation, such a logophoric element should be controlled by iLa in ese-clauses.
To implement this idea, we assume that EvidP is located at the CP-peripheries and introduces EB. Additionally, to explain the obligatoriness of iLa, we adopt the OP-log binding (Anand 2006) in the following manner: Anand (2006) argues that logophoric elements should be bound by a special kind of OP-log by assuming that (i) as a bound variable (BV), the former contains the uninterpretable logfeature ([ulog] , hereafter), and the latter can check and erase [ulog] in Chomsky's (1995) sense via a variable binding relation.
Along these lines, we propose that in ILS structures, the perspective sensitive elements in the C-T layer are just BVs which are born with [ulog] . This means that EBs in ILS should bear [ulog] . We further argue that OP-log is introduced by the ILS SpeechAct phrase (SAP-ILS, hereafter), which should be anchored to the closest context. Since Anand (2006 argues that there are various kinds of OP-logs with respect to the nature of the perspectives (e.g. OP-SOURCE, OP-SELF, OP-PIVOT, etc), we assume the OP-Evid is introduced at spec, SAP-ILS in the causal clauses.
In (18), the embedded context should be CR. Then, since the author of the CR is picked out as the subject of the main clause (Hara 2008) , we can predict that the EB should be identified with it.
As for nikka-clauses, however, indicatives are not sensitive to OP-log binding. Instead, similar to the tense interpretation in DAR cases, any elements in nikka-clauses can be evaluated with the CU directly. This implies, then, that EB in indicative nikka clauses can be freely associated with the speaker of the CU.
Explanation of PR
Now, we can explain PR as follows. First, recall the licensing of the CT in causal clauses. As discussed, for CT to be interpreted, an epistemic bearer is required. Regarding the nature of causal clauses, we suggest that the epistemic barer of CT is determined along with the EB. As the CT information is one of the main sources for the judge requirement, it is fair to say that EB is responsible for the CT information.
One immediate question now arises: regarding the Epistemic licensing, how can the Felicity condition in (17) hold? We believe that this is the key property of PR.
In our target sentence like (19), if Yuna is used as the subject of the main clause, the EB of the eseclause should be Yuna, the author of the CR.
(19) # pro2 cip-un sa-se, Yuna1-nun pro house-CT buy-because Yuna-Top Hoya2-wa kyeolhon-ha-yss-ta. Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl. 'Yuna married Hoya because he (at least) bought a house.'
As proposed, the epistemic bearer of CT is picked out as Yuna, and as a result, the CT information should be vested in Yuna's personal CT scale. What this means is that Yuna becomes the only person who can fulfill the judge requirement. Since such CT information is unilateral, even if it could be accepted in general, and thus be easily accommodated, it cannot be regarded as a mutual belief for all the relevant people, including the speaker. Thus, when the speaker utters (19), there is no way for her to be convinced of whether the causal connection is felicitous along with Yuna's personal CT scale. Therefore, the Felicity condition in (17) cannot be met in (19).
On the other hand, in cases like (20), the Felicity condition in (17) can trivially hold, since the EB is the speaker of the CU.
(20) pro2 cip-un sa-se, na1-nun pro house-CT buy-because I-Top Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta. Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl 'I married Hoya because he (at least) bought a house.' Thus, we can explain why CT can be properly used in ILS causal clauses only if the subject of the main clause is the speaker herself.
As predicted, however, such a contrast is not found with nikka-clauses. Due to the lack of the iLa in indicative clauses, the EB of the nikkaclause can be determined as either the author of the CR or the speaker of the CU. No matter who the subject of the main clause is, (17) does not pose any problem in (21).
The obviation of PR: NIS over ILS
In the previous section, we tried to explain PR based on the nature of the ILS structure. However, it brings one non-trivial question: as a subjunctive, should ese-clauses constitute ILS only? The answer seems negative concerning the obviation as seen in (22). (22) If ese-clauses were confined to ILS, (22) cannot be accounted for. This indicates that the most plausible candidate for the grammaticality of (22) will be a NIS structure. To explain this, we propose (23).
(23) NIS over ILS in causal clauses NIS can be selected only if ILS violates some structurally driven conditions.
In fact, (23) is reminiscent of the OC over Non-OC (Farkas 1992 , Bianchi 2003 cf. Hornstein 2006; McFadden & Sundaresan 2016) . Briefly speaking, its basic premise is that the OC structure is a default one, thereby it is preferred to Non-OC counterpart in general. For instance, (15) is an OC structure with PRO as discussed above. However, it has been argued that Korean has a regular null pronoun, namely pro, too. Thus, given the existence of the structures like (16b), it is possible to say that (15) can be parsed as a Non-OC structure with pro; since there are no other distinctive markers as seen in (16b), the resulting phonological string with pro would become exactly the same as the one with PRO. However, (15) does not allow Non-OC reading at all.
OC over Non-OC is proposed to explain why OC structure is generally selected in cases like (15). In the relevant literature (e.g. Farkas 1992 , Bianchi 2003 cf. McFadden & Sundaresan 2016) , its motivation is usually tied to the assumption that OC structure has a less complex C-T layer than the Non-OC counterpart in regard to phi-agreement and finiteness (but see Hornstein 2006 for an alternative based on 'parsing preference'). In this respect, the rationale behind OC over Non-OC can be understood in such a way that a more structurally economical construction should be selected unless there are clear reasons to block it.
Given the above-mentioned assumption that the OC-Non-OC pair is one instance of ILS-NIS pairs, we suggest that such a preference condition can be extended to all the ILS-NIS pairs as described in (23).
However, this raises another question: Why cannot the failure of the Felicity condition in (17) trigger the NIS over ILS?
Fortunately, there is evidence to show that pragmatically driven problems cannot be involved with the OC over Non-OC cases. In general, it has been argued that PRO in object-oriented OC should be interpreted de te (Anand 2006 , Landau 2015 . In this regard, (15) should be construed with de te attitude; if Yumi does not recognize the fact that her conversational partner (that is the addressee of the reported speech context) is indeed Yumi, the sentence becomes unacceptable (Park 2011 , Hoe 2014 . However, in the Non-OC structure with an overt pronominal subject like (16b), a de re reading is also available (Hoe 2014) . This can be interpreted as saying that pro in such a position-if possible-should allow a de re reading, as well (see also Sundaresan 2014) . Then, if pragmatic factors like the unavailability of the de te can trigger (23), pro can replace PRO allowing a de re attitude. If this were the case, however, we would not be able to explain why (15) should be interpreted as de te, since the supposed Non-OC structure and (15) have the exact same phonological string as discussed above.
If this is on the right track, we can conclude that a certain structurally driven condition is violated in (22) . Regarding this, we suggest (24).
(24) Anti-logophoricity (or Disjoint) Effects:
Non-logophoric pronouns in the scope of the OP-log must be disjoint from the antecedent of a logophoric element.
In order to more fully understand this, let us consider (25) first.
(25) a. Kofi be ye-dzo. Kofi say Log-leave 'Kofi1 said Log1/*2 left.' b. Kofi be e-dzo.
Kofi say 3 rd -leave 'Kofi1 said 3 rd 2/*1 left.' (Clements 1975) As shown in (25), in environments where a logophor can be licensed, if a run-of-the-mill 3 rd person pronoun is employed, it cannot refer to the individual that the logophor does (Koopman & Sportiche 1989 , Bianchi 2003 , Anand 2006 .
Along these lines, (24) can easily explain the obviation of PR in (22): a potential ILS structure is blocked due to (24) since the added goal argument is eventually co-indexed with the EB as illustrated in (26).
7 Thus, if an NIS structure is selected in (22), the Felicity condition in (17) can hold, thanks to the absence of iLa. 7 We suspect that (24) in (26) has to do with Condition C violation: If the EB in (26) is a sort of BV, it cannot c-command any co-indexed (referential) DPs. However, the exact motivation of (24) is not clear to us yet. In particular, it has been pointed out that (24) does not arise uniformly in all subjunctive clauses or logophor licensing environments (Bianchi 2001 , 2003 , Landau 2015 . For example, in some languages (e.g. Italian, Hebrew, etc.), (24) is observed with an overt pronominal subject in Non-OC complements. But it is not found in Korean as seen in (16b), and this remains as yet unsolved (see Landau 2015 for more detailed discussion). We leave this for future research. pro2 (GOAL) The example in (27) also buttresses this conclusion.
(27) pro1/#2 chaekimkam-un iss-ese, pro responsibility-CT exist-because Yuna1-nun Hoya2-wa kyeolhonha-yss-ta. Yuna-Top Hoya-with marry-Past-Decl 'Yuna married Hoya because she/#he (at least) has a sense of responsibility.' (Park & Hoe 2015) Logically, pro can denote the subject or the comitative argument of the main clause. However, PR is circumvented only when pro refers to the subject, allowing to obtain the proper CT interpretation.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have claimed that the differences between nikka and ese-clauses can be explained in terms of the mood distinction. To do so, we first assumed that causal clauses involve some epistemic step to qualify their causal connections. We then provided novel observations to show that when the CT marking is involved, nikka and ese-clauses differ with respect to who is responsible for the epistemic step. Finally, we claimed that this can be explained with syntactic phenomena, namely logophoric anchoring.
